Related-key attacks (RKAs) concern the security of cryptographic primitives in the situation where the key can be manipulated by the adversary. In the RKA setting, the adversary's power is expressed through the class of related-key deriving (RKD) functions which the adversary is restricted to using when modifying keys. Bellare and Kohno (Eurocrypt 2003) first formalised RKAs and pin-pointed the foundational problem of constructing RKA-secure pseudorandom functions (RKA-PRFs). To date there are few constructions for RKA-PRFs under standard assumptions, and it is a major open problem to construct RKA-PRFs for larger classes of RKD functions. We make significant progress on this problem. We first show how to repair the Bellare-Cash framework for constructing RKA-PRFs and extend it to handle the more challenging case of classes of RKD functions that contain claws. We apply this extension to show that a variant of the Naor-Reingold function already considered by Bellare and Cash is an RKA-PRF for a class of affine RKD functions under the DDH assumption, albeit with an exponential-time security reduction. We then develop a second extension of the Bellare-Cash framework, and use it to show that the same Naor-Reingold variant is actually an RKA-PRF for a class of degree d polynomial RKD functions under the stronger decisional d-Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption. As a significant technical contribution, our proof of this result avoids the exponential-time security reduction that was inherent in the work of Bellare and Cash and in our first result.
Introduction
Background and Context. A common approach to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme, known as provable security, is to relate its security to one of its underlying primitives or to an accepted hard computational problem. While this approach is now standard and widely accepted, there is still a significant gap between the existing models used in security proofs and the actual environment in which these cryptosystems are deployed. For example, most of the existing security models assume that the adversary has no information about the user's secret key. However, it is well known that this is not always true in practice: the adversary may be able to learn partial information about the secrets using different types of side-channel attacks, such as the study of energy consumption, fault injection, or timing analysis. In the particular case of fault injection, for instance, an adversary can learn not only partial information about the secret key, but he may also be able to force a cryptosystem to work with different but related secret keys. Then, if he can observe the outcome of this cryptosystem, he may be able to break it. This is what is known in the literature as a related-key attack (RKA).
Most primitives are designed without taking related-key attacks into consideration so their security proofs do not provide any guarantee against such attacks. Hence, a cryptographic scheme that is perfectly safe in theory may be completely vulnerable in practice. Indeed, many such attacks were found during the last decade, especially against practical blockciphers [BDK05, BDK08, BDK + 10, BK09, BKN09, KHP07] . Inspired by this cryptanalytic work, some years ago, theoreticians started to develop appropriate security models and search for cryptographic primitives which can be proven RKA secure.
Formal Foundations of RKA Security. Though RKAs were first introduced by Biham and Knudsen [Bih93, Knu92] in the early 1990s, it was only in 2003 that Bellare and Kohno [BK03] began the formalisation of the theoretical foundations for RKA security. We recall their security definition for RKA security of PRFs here. Let F : K × D → R be a family of functions for a security parameter k, and let Φ = {φ: K → K} be a set of functions on the key space K, called a related-key deriving (RKD) function set. We say that F is a Φ-RKA-PRF if for any polynomial-time adversary, its advantage in the following game is negligible. The game starts by picking a random challenge bit b, a random target key K ∈ K and a random function G: K × D → R. The adversary can repeatedly query an oracle that, given a pair (φ, x) ∈ Φ × D, returns either F (φ(K), x), if b = 1, or G(φ(K), x), if b = 0. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b , and its advantage is defined by 2 Pr [ b = b ]−1. Note that if the class Φ of RKD functions contains only the identity function, then this notion matches standard PRF security.
Bellare and Cash [BC10a] designed the first RKA-PRFs secure under standard assumptions, by adapting the Naor-Reingold PRF [NR97]. Their RKA-PRFs are secure for RKA function classes consisting of certain multiplicative and additive classes. To explain their results, let us begin by recalling the definition of the Naor-Reingold PRF. Let G = g be a group of prime order p. Let NR: (Z * p ) n+1 × {0, 1} n → G denote the Naor-Reingold PRF that given a key a = (a[0], . . . , a[n]) ∈ (Z * p ) n+1 and input x = x [1] . . . x[n] ∈ {0, 1} n returns
The keyspace of the Naor-Reingold PRF is K = (Z * p ) n+1 , which has a group structure under the operation of component-wise multiplication modulo p, denoted * . Now let Φ * denote the class of component-wise multiplicative functions on (Z * p ) n+1 , that is Φ * = {φ: a ∈ (Z * p ) n+1 → b * a | b ∈ (Z * p ) n+1 }. It is easy to see that NR is not itself a Φ * -RKA-PRF, since it suffers from simple algebraic attacks, but using a collision-resistant hash function h: {0, 1} n ×G n+1 → {0, 1} n−2 , Bellare and Cash were able to show that a simple modification of the Naor-Reingold PRF does yield a Φ * -RKA-PRF in constructing RKA-PRFs for broader classes would immediately transfer to these other primitives via the results of [BCM11] . A subsidiary question is whether it is possible to repair the Bellare-Cash framework without requiring stronger hash compatibility conditions on the key-transformer. This, if achievable, would reinstate their Φ + -RKA-PRF.
A partial answer to the first question was provided by Goyal, O'Neill and Rao [GOR11] , who proposed RKA-secure weak-PRF and symmetric encryption schemes for polynomial functions using the Decisional Truncated q-ADHE problem. RKA-secure weak-PRFs, however, are significantly weaker than standard RKA-PRFs since their security only holds with respect to random inputs. Wee [Wee12] provided RKA-secure PKE for linear functions, while Bellare, Paterson, and Thomson [BPT12] proposed a framework for obtaining RKA-secure IBE for affine and polynomial RKD function sets, from which RKA security for signatures, PKE (and more) for the same RKD function sets follows using the results of [BCM11] and extensions thereof. However, in respect of these works, it should be noted that achieving RKA security for randomised primitives appears to be substantially easier than for PRFs which are deterministic objects. An extended discussion on this point can be found in [BC10a, Section 1] .
In parallel work to ours, Lewi et al. [LMR14] showed that the key homomorphic PRFs from Boneh et al. [BLMR13] (and slight extensions of them) are RKA-secure. Specifically, they show RKA-security for a strict subset of Φ + for the PRF of [BLMR13] that is based on the Learning with Error (LWE) problem, and against a claw-free class of affine functions for the PRF of [BLMR13] that is based on multilinear maps. They also showed that, if the adversary's queries are restricted to unique inputs, these two PRFs are RKA-secure for larger classes, namely a class of affine RKD functions (with a low-norm for the "linear" part) for the LWE-based PRF and a class of polynomial RKD functions for the PRF based on multilinear maps. These classes are not really comparable to our classes Φ aff and Φ d of affine and polynomial functions defined below, because the secret-key structures are slightly different. However, we remark that Lewi et al. [LMR14] do not deal with claw-free classes and do not show ways to leverage unique-input RKA security to full RKA security. We handle both of these issues in our paper, and it may be possible to extend our solutions to their setting. It should also be remarked that the construction of Barnahee and Peikert [BP14] may also yield another RKA-secure PRF based on LWE.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we make substantial progress on the main question above, obtaining RKA-PRFs for substantially larger classes of RKD functions than were previously known. Along the way, we recover the original Bellare-Cash framework, showing that their original technical conditions on the key-transformer are in fact already sufficient to enable a (different) proof of RKA security to go through. Let us first introduce our main results on specific RKA-PRFs, and then explain the technical means by which they are obtained.
For p prime and n, d ≥ 1, let Φ d denote the class of functions from Z n p to Z n p each of whose component functions is a non-constant polynomial in one variable of degree at most d. That is, we have:
For the special case d = 1, we denote Φ 1 by Φ aff (aff for affine functions). Note that Φ + ⊂ Φ aff . We will construct RKA-PRFs for the RKD-function classes Φ aff and Φ d for each d. To this end, let G = g be a group of prime order p, let D = {0, 1} n × G n and let h: D → {0, 1} n−2 be a hash function. Let w[i] = 0 i−1 1 0 n−i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Define F : Z n p × ({0, 1} n \ 0 n ) → G by:
F (a, x) = NR * (a, 11 h(x, NR * (a, w))) for all a ∈ Z n p and x ∈ {0, 1} n . This is the same F as in the withdrawn construction of [BC10a] .
Theorems 4.5 and 6.4 show that this function is an RKA-PRF for both the RKD-function classes Φ aff and Φ d (for each d), under reasonable hardness assumptions. For our first result on the Φ aff -RKA-PRF security of F , we recover and extend the withdrawn result of Bellare and Cash [BC10a] , under the same hardness assumption that they required, namely the standard DDH assumption. Here our proof, like that in [BC10a] , requires an exponential-time reduction. We then develop a further extension of the Bellare-Cash framework enabling us to circumvent their use of key-transformers having a key malleability property. We use this framework to modularise our proof that F is also a Φ d -RKA-PRF. As part of this proof, we require the decisional d-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (d-DDHI) assumption, introduced in [GOR11]. Informally, the d-DDHI problem in a group G of prime order p consists of deciding, given inputs (g, g a , . . . , g a d ) and z, where g is a generator of G, whether z is equal to g 1 a or to a random group element. Notably, in our analysis of the Φ d -RKA-PRF security of F , we are able to avoid an exponential-time reduction. This puts the RKA-PRF F on the same footing as the surviving constructions in [BC10a] .
Let us now expand on the technical aspects of our contributions.
Proof Barriers and Techniques. We first show how the Bellare-Cash framework can be modified to deal with RKD functions that are not claw-free, meaning that there exist pairs of different RKD functions φ 1 and φ 2 and a key K ∈ K, such that φ 1 (K) = φ 2 (K). Up to now, only claw-free classes have been considered for RKA-PRFs. But classes Φ underlying practical attacks such as fault injections have no reason to be claw-free, so dealing with non-claw-free classes of RKD functions is important in advancing RKA security towards practice. Moreover, both our RKD function classes of interest, Φ aff and Φ d , do contain claws. The lack of claw-freeness poses a problem in security proofs because, if an adversary is able to find two RKD functions which lead to the same derived key, he can detect this via his queries, and then the equation φ 1 (K) = φ 2 (K) may leak information on K sufficient to enable the adversary to break RKA-PRF security in a particular construction. We overcome the lack of claw-freeness in our adaptation of the Bellare-Cash framework by introducing two new concepts, Φ-Key-Collision Security for PRFs and Φ-Statistical-Key-Collision Security. The former is a property similar to the identity-collision-resistance property defined in [BCM11] in the context of pseudorandom generators and refers to the non-existence of an adversary who can find a colliding key (i.e. φ 1 (K) = φ 2 (K) for φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ Φ), when given oracle access to the PRF under related keys φ(K). The latter concept is essentially the same, but now oracle access to the PRF is replaced by oracle access to a random function. These properties are just the right ingredients necessary to generalise the Bellare-Cash framework to the non-claw-free case.
At the same time as dealing with claws, we are able to repair the gap in the proof for the original Bellare-Cash framework, showing that their original hash function compatibility condition required of the key-transformer is already strong enough to enable an alternative proof of RKA security. Our new proof introduces a slightly different sequence of game hops in order to avoid the apparent impasse in the original proof. Our main theorem establishing the RKA-PRF security of functions arising from this framework is Theorem 3.1. It repairs and extends the corresponding main theorem in [BC10a] . Our theorem is then combined with an analysis of the specific function NR * to obtain Theorem 4.5 concerning the Φ aff -RKA-PRF security of F .
To show that F is also an RKA-PRF for Φ d , we still have a second major difficulty to overcome. While Φ d -Key-Collision Security and Φ d -Statistical-Key-Collision Security can still be proven for F , we no longer have the key-transformer component that is critical to the Bellare-Cash framework. Instead, in Section 5, we introduce a further extension of their framework, replacing the key-transformer with a stronger pseudorandomness condition on the base PRF M used in the construction, which we call (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security. The new requirement essentially states that M should already act as a Φ-RKA-PRF on a restricted domain S, provided the queries (φ 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (φ k , x k ) made by the Φ-RKA-PRF adversary to its oracle with x i ∈ S are all for distinct x i . Under this condition, we are able to prove Theorem 5.1 establishing the security of RKA-PRFs arising from our further extension of the Bellare-Cash framework. This theorem then enables us to prove in a modular fashion that F is also an RKA-PRF for Φ d .
The final technical challenge is in proving that NR * , playing the role of M , satisfies the relevant (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security property so as to allow the application of Theorem 5.1. This is done in a crucial lemma, Lemma 6.3, whose proof involves a delicate series of hybrids in which we gradually replace the oracle responses to queries (φ i , x i ) for x i in a suitable set S with random values. We exploit the algebraic nature of the function NR * to ensure that the hybrids are close under a particular pair of hardness assumptions (the (N, d)-Polynomial DDH and (N, d)-EDDH assumptions, which are stated in the appendix). We also make use of an efficient, approximate (but close to perfect) procedure to detect linear dependencies arising in the simulation from the adversary's oracle queries. This procedure is key to making the entire proof efficient (rather than exponential-time). Finally, we provide a series of reductions relating our pair of hardness assumptions to the d-DDHI assumption. Examining the details of the proof shows that we can recover our result concerning Φ aff -RKA-PRF security of F under DDH (rather than 1-DDHI), but now without an exponential-time reduction.
Definitions
Notations and Conventions. Let Fun(K ×D, R) be the set of all families of functions F : K ×D → R. A family of functions F : K × D → R takes a key K ∈ K and an input x ∈ D and returns an output F (K, x) ∈ R. If x is a vector then |x| denotes its length, and x = (x [1] , . . . , x[|x|]). A binary string x is identified with a vector over {0, 1} so that |x| denotes its length, x[i] its i-th bit and, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i ≤ j, x[i, . . . , j] the binary string x[i] . . . x [j] . For a binary string x ∈ {0, 1} n and an integer d, we denote by d · x the string y = y [1] . . . y[n] ∈ {0, d} n defined by y[i] = d · x[i] for i = 1, . . . , n. For two strings x, y ∈ {0, . . . , d} n , we denote by y
x the fact that y[i] ≤ x[i], ∀i = 1, . . . , n and we denote by S(x) the set {i | x[i] = 0}. If φ is a vector of functions from S 1 to S 2 with |φ| = n and a ∈ S n 1 then we denote by φ(a) the vector (φ[1](a[1]), . . . , φ[n](a[n])) ∈ S n 2 . If F : K × D → R is a family of functions and x is a vector over D then F (K, x) denotes the vector (F (K, x[1]), . . . , F (K, x[|x|])). If S is a set, then |S| denotes its size. We denote by s $ ← S the operation of picking at random s in S. If A is a randomized algorithm, we denote by y $ ← A(x 1 , x 2 , . . .) the operation of running A on inputs (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) with fresh coins and letting y denote the output.
Games. Some of our definitions and proofs use code-based game-playing [BR06] . Recall that a game has an Initialize procedure, procedures to respond to adversary's oracle queries, and a Finalize procedure. A game G is executed with an adversary A as follows. First, Initialize executes and its outputs are the inputs to A. Then A executes, its oracle queries being answered by the corresponding procedures of G. When A terminates, its outputs become the input to the Finalize procedure. The output of the latter, denoted G A is called the output of the game, and we let "G A ⇒ 1", abbreviated W in the proofs, denote the event that this game output takes the value 1. Boolean flags are assumed initialized to false. Games G i , G j are identical until flag if their code differs only in statements that follow the setting of flag to true. The running time of an adversary by convention is the worst case time for the execution of the adversary with any of the games defining its security, so that the time of the called game procedures is included.
PRFs. PRFs were introduced by [GGM84] . A PRF is a family of functions F : K × D → R which is efficiently computable and so that it is hard to distinguish a function chosen randomly from the PRF family from a random function, which is formally defined as the fact that the advantage of any efficient adversary in attacking the standard prf security of F is negligible. The advantage of an adversary A in attacking the standard prf security of a family of functions F : RKA-PRFs. We recall the definitions from [BK03] . Let F : K×D → R be a family of functions and Φ ⊆ Fun(K, K). The members of Φ are called RKD (Related-Key Deriving) functions. An adversary is said to be Φ-restricted if its oracle queries (φ, x) satisfy φ ∈ Φ. The advantage of a Φ-restricted adversary A in attacking the prf-rka security of F is defined via
Game RKPRFReal F begins by picking K $ ← K and then responds to oracle query RKFn(φ, x) via F (φ(K), x). Game RKPRFRand F begins by picking G $ ← Fun(K × D, R) and responds to oracle query RKFn(φ, x) via G(φ(K), x). We say that F is a Φ-RKA-secure PRF if for any Φ-restricted, efficient adversary, its advantage in attacking the prf-rka security is negligible.
Strong Key Fingerprint. A strong key fingerprint is a tool used in proofs to detect whether a key arises more than once in a simulation, even if we do not have any information about the key itself. We recall the definition from [BC10a] . Suppose F : K × D → R is a family of functions. Let w be a vector over D and let n = |w|. We say that w is a strong key fingerprint for F if
for all distinct K, K ∈ K.
Key-Malleability. As defined in [BC10a] , let F : K × D → R be a family of functions and Φ be a class of RKD functions. Suppose T is a deterministic algorithm that, given an oracle f : D → R and inputs (φ, x) ∈ Φ × D, returns a point T f (φ, x) ∈ R. T is said to be a key-transformer for (F, Φ) if it satisfies the correctness and uniformity conditions. Correctness asks that T F (K,·) (φ, x) = F (φ(K), x) for every (φ, K, x) ∈ Φ × K × D. Let us say that a Φ-restricted adversary is unique-input if, in its oracle queries (φ 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (φ q , x q ), the points x 1 , . . . , x q are always distinct. Uniformity requires that for any (even inefficient) Φ-restricted, unique-input adversary U ,
where game KTReal T is initialized by picking f $ ← Fun(D, R) and responds to query KTFn(φ, x) via T f (φ, x), while KTRand T has no initialization and responds to oracle query KTFn(φ, x) by returning a value y $ ← R chosen uniformly at random in R. If such a key-transformer exists, we say that F is a Φ-key-malleable PRF.
Compatible Hash Function. Let F : K × D → R be a family of functions and Φ be a class of RKD functions, such that there is a key-transformer T for (F, Φ). Let w ∈ D m and let D = D × R m . We denote by Qrs(T, F, Φ, w) the set of all w ∈ D such that there exists (f, φ, i) ∈ Fun(D, R) × Φ× {1, . . . , m} such that the computation of T f (φ, w[i]) makes oracle query w. Then, we say that a hash function H: D → S is compatible with (T, F, Φ, w), if S = D\Qrs(T, F, Φ, w). Note that this definition is the same as that given in the original Bellare-Cash framework [BC10a] rather than the stronger one used in the authors' repaired version [BC10b] . 
proc where the probability is over (
Hardness Assumptions. Our proofs make use of the d-Strong Discrete Logarithm (d -SDL) and Decisional d-Diffie-Hellman Inversion (d -DDHI) problems given in [GOR11] and described in Figure 1 . We define the advantage of an adversary D against the d -SDL problem in G as
where the probability is over the choices of a ∈ Z p , g ∈ G, and the random coins used by the adversary. The advantage of an adversary D against the d -DDHI problem in G is defined to be
where the probabilities are over the choices of a, z ∈ Z p , g ∈ G, and the random coins used by the adversary. We have two assumptions corresponding to the hardness of these problems, the d-SDL assumption and the d-DDHI assumption. Setting d = 1 in the d-SDL problem, we recover the usual definition of the DL problem in G.
Repairing and Extending the Bellare-Cash Framework
Here, we give a method to deal with classes of RKD functions that are not claw-free, such as affine classes, by repairing and extending the general framework of Bellare and Cash from [BC10a] . Our approach still relies on key-malleability, meaning that it is not generally applicable since almost all the known PRFs are not key-malleable for interesting classes of functions. However, as we shall see, it does provide an easy way to obtain a Φ aff -RKA-secure PRF, using the variant NR * of the Naor-Reingold PRF. In Section 5, we will present a further extension of the Bellare-Cash approach that enables us to deal with PRFs that are not key-malleable.
To deal with non-claw-freeness, we first introduce two new notions. The first one is called Φ-Key-Collision Security and captures the likelihood that an adversary finds two RKD functions which lead to the same derived key in a given PRF construction. The second one, called Φ-Statistical-Key-Collision Security, is similar, but replaces the oracle access to the PRF with an oracle access to a random function.
Φ-Key-Collision (Φ-kc) Security. Let Φ be a class of RKD functions. We define the advantage of an adversary A against the Φ-key-collision security of a PRF M : K × D → R, denoted by Adv kc Φ,M (A), to be the probability of success in the game on the left side of Figure 2 , where the functions φ appearing in A's queries are restricted to lie in Φ.
Φ-Statistical-Key-Collision (Φ-skc) Security. Let Φ be a class of RKD functions. We define the advantage of an adversary A against the Φ-statistical-key-collision security for Fun(K × D, R), denoted by Adv skc Φ (A), to be the probability of success in the game on the right side of Figure 2 . Here the functions φ appearing in A's queries are again restricted to lie in Φ.
Using these notions, we can now prove the following theorem, which both repairs and extends the main result of [BC10a] .
proc Initialize 
for all K ∈ K and x ∈ D. Let A be a Φ-restricted adversary against the prf-rka security of F that makes Q A ≤ |S| oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary B against the standard prf security of M , an adversary C against the cr security of H, an adversary D against the Φ-kc security of M and an adversary E against Φ-skc security for Fun(K × D, R) such that
Adversaries C, D and E have the same running time as A. Adversary B has the same running time as A plus the time required for Q A · (m + 1) executions of the key-transformer T.
Note that if the class Φ is claw-free, then the advantage of any adversary in breaking Φ-kc security of M or Φ-skc security for Fun(K × D, R) is zero. In this case Theorem 3.1 matches exactly the main theorem of [BC10a] , under the original and weaker definition of hash function compatibility from [BC10a] . This justifies our claim of repairing the Bellare-Cash framework.
Overview of the Proof. The proof of the above theorem is detailed in Appendix A and relies on the sequence of 11 games (games G 0 − G 10 ) described in Figure 4 . Here we provide a brief overview.
Since the RKD functions that we consider in our case may have claws, we start by dealing with possible collisions on the related-keys in the RKPRFReal case, using the key-collision notion (games G 0 − G 2 ). Then, in games G 3 − G 4 , we deal with possible collisions on hash values in order to ensure that the hash values h used to compute the output y are pairwise distinct so the attacker is unique-input. Then, using the properties of the key-transformer and the compatibility condition, we show that it is hard to distinguish the output from a uniformly random output (games G 5 − G 7 ) based on the standard prf security of M . Finally, we use the statistical-key-collision security notion to deal with possible key collisions in the RKPRFRand case (games G 8 − G 10 ) so that G 10 matches the description of the RKPRFRand game.
Remark 3.2 It is worth noting that we deviate from the original proof of [BC10a] in games G 5 −G 7 , filling the gap in their original proof, but under the same technical conditions on compatibility. Unlike in their proof, we are able to show that the output of F is already indistinguishable from a uniformly random output as soon as one replaces the underlying PRF M with a random function f due to the uniformity condition of the transformer. In order to build a unique-input adversary against the uniformity condition, the main trick is to precompute the values of f (w) for all w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w) and use these values to compute T f (φ, w[i]), for i = 1, . . . , |w| and φ ∈ Φ, whenever needed. This avoids the need to query the oracle in the uniformity game twice on the same input when computing the fingerprint.
Related-Key Security for Affine RKD Functions
In this section, we apply the above framework to the variant NR * of the Naor-Reingold PRF. Recall that NR * :
for all a ∈ Z n p and x ∈ {0, 1} n \{0 n }. We recall the definition of Φ aff (= Φ 1 ) from the introduction. Using the above theorem, we prove that NR * can be used to build a Φ aff -RKA-secure PRF under the DDH assumption, thereby recovering and strengthening the withdrawn result from [BC10a] . We first recall the following lemma from [BC10a] .
Lemma 4.1 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
Let A be an adversary against the standard prf security of NR * that makes Q A oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary B against the DDH problem such that In what follows, we prove the properties needed to apply Theorem 3.1 to NR * . The proofs of the above lemmas are detailed in Appendix B.
Strong Key Fingerprint. Let w[i] = 0 i−1 1 0 n−i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Then w is a strong key fingerprint for NR * . Indeed, we have (NR * (a, w[1]), . . . , NR * (a, w[n])) = (g a [1] , . . . , g a[n] ), so if a = a are two distinct keys in K = Z n p , then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
, . . . , w[n]}, so let D = {0, 1} n × G n and let h: D → {0, 1} n−2 be a collision resistant hash function. Then the hash function defined by H(x, z) = 11 h(x, z) is a collision resistant hash function that is compatible with (T aff , NR * , Φ aff , w) since every element of Qrs(T aff , NR * , Φ aff , w) has at most one 1 bit and every output of H has at least two 1 bits. Note that in particular the output of H is never 0 n , so it is always in the domain of NR * .
Lemma 4.2 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
Let D be an adversary against the Φ aff -keycollision security of NR * that makes Q D oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary C against the DL problem in G with the same running time as that of D such that
Since the hardness of DDH implies the hardness of DL, the above lemma does not introduce any additional hardness assumptions beyond DDH.
Lemma 4.3 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
Then T aff is a key-transformer for (NR * , Φ aff ). Moreover, the worst-case running time of this key-transformer is the time required to compute O(2 n ) exponentiations in G.
Lemma 4.4 Let G = g be a group of prime order p. Let A be an adversary against the Φ affstatistical-key-collision security for Fun(Z n p × {0, 1} n , G) making Q A queries. Then we have
.
We now have everything we need to apply Theorem 3.1 to NR * . Combining Theorem 3.1, Lemmas 4.1-4.4 and the above properties, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
for all a ∈ Z n p and x ∈ {0, 1} n . Let A be a Φ aff -restricted adversary against the prf-rka security of F that makes Q A oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary B against the DDH problem in G, an adversary C against the cr security of h, and an adversary D against the DL problem in G, such that
The running time of B is that of A plus the time required to compute O(Q A ·(n+1)·2 n ) exponentiations in G. The running times of C and D are the same as that of A.
Further Generalisation of the Bellare-Cash Framework
We introduce a new type of PRF, called an (S, Φ)-Unique-Input-RKA-PRF. We then use this notion as a tool in a further extension of the Bellare-Cash framework that can be applied to nonkey-malleable PRFs and non-claw-free classes of RKD functions. This new framework provides in particular a route to proving that the variant of the Naor-Reingold PRF introduced in Section 3 is actually Φ d -RKA-secure.
(S, Φ)-Unique-Input-RKA-PRF. Let M : K × D → R be a family of functions. Let S be a subset of D and Φ be a class of RKD functions. We consider the class of adversaries A in Figure 3 such that all queries (φ, x) with x ∈ S made by A to its oracle are for distinct values of x. That is, for any sequence of A's queries (φ 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (φ k , x k ) with x i ∈ S for all i = 1, . . . , k, we require all the x i to be distinct (no such restriction is made for queries (φ i , x i ) with x i / ∈ S). We denote the advantage of such an adversary A by Adv ui-prf-rka Φ,S,M (B). We then say that M is an (S, Φ)-uniqueinput-RKA-secure PRF if the advantage of any such Φ-restricted, efficient adversary A in attacking (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security is negligible.
The following theorem is an analogue of Theorem 3.1 in which the roles of key malleability and hash function compatibility are replaced by our new notion, (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security.
for all K ∈ K and x ∈ D. Let A be a Φ-restricted adversary against the prf-rka security of F that makes Q A ≤ |S| oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary B against the (S, Φ)-uniqueinput-prf-rka security of M , an adversary C against the cr security of H, an adversary D against the Φ-kc security of M and an adversary E against Φ-skc security for Fun(K × D, R) such that
Adversaries C, D and E have the same running time as A. Adversary B makes (m + 1) · Q A oracle queries and has the same running time as A.
Overview of the Proof. The proof of the above theorem is detailed in Appendix C and relies on the sequence of 10 games (games G 0 − G 9 ) described in Figure 6 . Here we provide a brief overview.
Since the RKD functions that we consider in our case may have claws, we start by dealing with possible collisions on the related-keys in the RKPRFReal case, using the key-collision notion(games G 0 − G 2 ). Then, in games G 3 − G 4 , we deal with possible collisions on hash values in order to ensure that the hash values h used to compute the output y are distinct. Then, in contrast to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we use the new (S, Φ)-Unique-Input-RKA-PRF notion and the compatibility condition to show that it is hard to distinguish the output of F from a uniformly random output(games G 5 −G 6 ). Finally, we use the statistical-key-collision security notion to deal with possible key collisions in the RKPRFRand case (games G 7 − G 9 ) so that G 9 matches the description of the RKPRFRand Game.
Remark 5.2 In Appendix D, we explore the relationship between key-malleable PRFs and uniqueinput-RKA-secure PRFs. Specifically, we show that the (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security of a Φ-key-malleable PRF M is implied by its regular prf security if the key-transformer T associated with M satisfies a new condition that we call S-uniformity. This condition demands that the usual uniformity condition for T should hold on the subset S of D rather than on all of D. Whether S-uniformity is implied by (regular) uniformity is an open question.
Related-Key Security for Polynomial RKD Functions
We apply Theorem 5.1 to the variant NR * of the Naor-Reingold PRF for the class of RKD functions
. . , n}. Specifically, we prove that NR * can be used to build a Φ d -RKA-secure PRF, under the d-DDHI assumption. Remarkably, our proof provides an efficient reduction, avoiding an exponential running time like that seen in Theorem 4.5. The key step in establishing our result is Lemma 6.3. Its proof involves at its core the construction of a bespoke key-transformer to handle Φ d and a delicate analysis of it using sequences of hybrid games.
In what follows, we prove the various properties needed to apply Theorem 5.1 to NR * . The proofs of Lemmas 6.1-6.3 can be found in Appendix E.
Strong Key Fingerprint. Let w[i] = 0 i−1 1 0 n−i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, as before, w is a strong key fingerprint for NR * .
Hash Function. Let D = {0, 1} n × G n and let h: D → {0, 1} n−2 be a collision resistant hash function. Then, as previously, the hash function defined by H(x, z) = 11 h(x, z) is a collision resistant hash function with range S satisfying S ⊆ {0, 1} n \ ({w[1] , . . . , w[n]} ∪ {0 n }).
Lemma 6.1 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
Let D be an adversary against the Φ d -key-collision security of NR * that makes Q D oracle queries. Then we can construct an adversary C against the d-SDL problem in G such that Lemma 6.2 Let G be a group of prime order p. Let Fun(Z n p × {0, 1} n , G) be the set of functions from which the random function in the Φ d -statistical-key-collision security game is taken. Let A be an adversary against the Φ d -statistical-key-collision security that makes Q A queries. Then we have
Lemma 6.3 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
. Let A be an adversary against the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * that makes Q A oracle queries. Then, assuming nd ≤ √ p, we can design an adversary B against the d-DDHI problem in G such that
The running time of B is that of A plus the time required to compute O(d · (n + Q A )) exponentiations in G and O(Q 3 A · (nd + Q A )) operations in Z p . Finally, by combining the results in Lemmas 6.1-6.3 with Theorem 5.1, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4 Let G = g be a group of prime order p and let NR * be defined via NR * (a,
for all a ∈ Z n p and x ∈ {0, 1} n . Let A be a Φ d -restricted adversary against the prf-rka security of F that makes Q A ≤ |{0, 1} n−2 | oracle queries. Then, assuming nd ≤ √ p, we can construct an adversary B against the d-DDHI problem in G, an adversary C against the cr security of h, and an adversary D against the d -SDL problem in G such that
The running time of B is that of A plus O(d · (n + Q A )) exponentiations in G and O(Q 3 A · (nd + Q A )) operations in Z p . C has the same running time as A. The running time of D is that of A plus the time required to factorize a polynomial of degree at most d in F p , which is sub-quadratic in d, logarithmic in p. The proof is based on the sequence of games in Figure 4 . Much of the proof is similar to the proof of the general framework of Bellare and Cash from [BC10a] . However, we have additional games to deal with non-claw-freeness (games G 1 , G 2 , G 9 and G 10 ), and some games (games G 6 and G 7 ) are modified to deal with the gap in the proof of the corresponding theorem in [BC10a] . Let W i denote the event that game G i output takes the value 1.
Game G 1 introduces storage of used RKD-functions and values of w in sets D and E respectively and sets flag 1 to true if the same value of w arises for two different RKD-functions. Since this storage does not affect the values returned by RKFn
Game G 2 adds the boxed code which changes how the repetition of an w value is handled, by picking instead a random value from R m \E that will not repeat any previous one. Games G 1 and G 2 are identical until flag 1 is set to true, hence we have
where E 1 denotes the event that the execution of A with game G 1 sets flag 1 to true. We design an adversary D attacking the Φ-key-collision security of M such that
. Adversary D runs A. When the latter makes a RKFn-query (φ, x), adversary D queries (φ, w[i]), for i = 1, . . . , |w|, to its oracle, then computes w and then h = H(x, w) and finally queries (φ, h) to its oracle and sends it to A. When A stops, D searches for two different RKD-functions φ queried by A that lead to the same value w and returns these two functions if found. Since w is a strong key fingerprint, two such functions lead to the same key, so D wins if he finds such two functions. (Of course, if the class of RKD-functions is claw-free, the advantage of the attacker is 0.) Game G 3 introduces storage of hash values in a set G and sets flag 2 to true if the same hash output arises twice. Since this storage does not affect the values returned by RKFn
Game G 4 adds the boxed code which changes how repetition of hash values is handled, by picking instead a random value h from S\G that will not repeat any previously used hash value. Games G 3 and G 4 are identical until flag 2 is set to true, hence we have
where E 2 denotes the event that the execution of A with game G 3 sets flag 2 to true. We design an adversary C attacking the cr security of H such that Adversary C starts by picking K $ ← K and initializes j ← 0. It runs A. When the latter makes an RKFn-query (φ, x), adversary C responds via:
When A halts, C searches for a, b satisfying 1 ≤ a < b ≤ j such that h a = h b and, if it finds them, outputs (x a , w a ), (x b , w b ) and halts. The pairs (x a , w a ) and (x b , w b ) are distinct. Indeed, consider two cases: first, if φ a = φ b then since A never repeats an oracle query,
In game G 5 , we use the key transformer T to compute M (φ(K), ·) via oracle calls to M (K, ·). The correctness property of the key transformer implies
In game G 6 , we replace the oracle M (K, ·) given to the key transformer T by a random function f . We design an adversary B attacking the prf security of M such that 
where Fn is B's own oracle. When A halts, B halts with the same output. Then ] . In game G 7 , instead of computing the output y using the key-transformer, we set the value y to a uniformly random value. To show that games G 6 and G 7 are perfectly indistinguishable, we use the uniformity condition of the Key-Transformer T. Let us recall that, as formally defined in [BC10a, Section 3.1], the uniformity condition states that for any (even inefficient) Φ-restricted, unique-input adversary U ,
where game KTReal T picks f $ ← Fun(D, R) during the initialization and responds to oracle query KTFn(φ, x) via T f (φ, x), while game KTRand T has no initialization and responds to oracle query KTFn(φ, x) by returning a value y $ ← R chosen uniformly at random in R. We show that if an adversary A can distinguish games G 6 and G 7 , then we can construct a unique-input adversary U that can distinguish games KTReal T and KTRand T ; since T is a key-transformer, these two games are perfectly indistinguishable for a unique-input adversary by the uniformity condition. Hence, so are G 6 and G 7 .
Adversary U starts by initializing sets D ← ∅, E ← ∅, G ← ∅, then makes the queries (id, w) to its oracle, for every w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w) and stores these values. This is possible under our assumption that id ∈ Φ. We let f w denote the value that D gets from its oracle in response to the query (id, w). Depending on U 's oracle, the value of f w for w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w) is either T f (id, w) = f (w) (KTReal T ), with f the random function defined in the initialize procedure of KTReal T , or a uniformly random value from R (KTRand T ). All these values will be used by U to compute the value w in its simulation. Now, U runs A. When A makes an oracle query (φ, x), U starts by computing the values w[i], for i = 1, . . . , |w|, using the values f w he has stored, the function φ he gets from A, and the key-transformer T. Note that, because U already queried (id, w) to its oracle for every w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w), U is able to compute by itself the values w[i], for i = 1, . . . , |w|. This is because, in making these queries, U already sets a value f w for every w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w), and this is the set of all values that might be needed in computing T f (φ, w[i]), for i = 1, . . . , |w| and φ ∈ Φ. Notice that, in making these queries all at once at the beginning, U remains a unique-input adversary. After computing w, U checks if w ∈ E and φ / ∈ D. If these conditions hold, U picks w
and checks if h ∈ G. If this holds, U picks h $ ← S\G at random. Notice that this step guarantees that all values h are in S and are all distinct as long as A makes at most |S| queries. Finally, U sets G ← G ∪ {h}, makes the query (φ, h) to its oracle, and returns the value it gets, which is either T f (φ, h) or a uniformly random value, to A. When A halts, U halts with the same output. The compatibility condition ensures that S does not contain any w with w ∈ Qrs(T, M, Φ, w). It follows from these observations that U is a unique-input adversary. Finally, it is clear that if U 's oracle is KTReal T , then it simulates exactly game G 6 with f being the function f chosen at random in the initialize procedure of game KTReal T . If U 's oracle is KTRand T , then it simulates exactly game G 7 since the values given to A are uniformly random values. Then, we have Games G 7 and G 8 are identical since even if two different queries lead to the same key, the "If" test ensures that the returned value is still uniformly random over R. Hence,
Games G 8 and G 9 are identical until flag 3 is set to true, hence we have
where E 3 denotes the event that the execution of A with game G 9 sets flag 3 to true. We design an adversary E breaking Φ-skc security for Fun(K × D, R) such that:
Adversary E runs A. When the latter makes a RKFn-query (φ, x), so does E and E returns the value he receives to A. When A stops, if A has queried two different functions φ 1 and φ 2 such that φ 1 (K) = φ 2 (K) then b was set to 1 when the second of these two functions was queried by E, and then E wins. (Of course, if the class of RKD functions is claw-free, this probability is 0.)
Games G 9 and G 10 are identical, so
Equation (1) on page 8 now follows by combining the bounds arising in the different game hops.
B Proof of Lemmas in Section 4
In this section, we give the proofs of lemmas in Section 4.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let D be an adversary against the Φ aff -key-collision security of NR * that makes Q D oracle queries. Then we construct an adversary C against the DL problem in G as follows. Adversary C receives as input a DL tuple (g, g a ). Adversary C then picks j $ ← {1, . . . , n} at random; this is a guess of a coordinate where the two vectors of affine functions φ 1 and φ 2 that D will use as inputs in the Finalize procedure are different. Then C picks a[i] $ ← Z p for i = 1, . . . , n, i = j at random. Adversary C implicitly sets a[j] = a. When D makes a query (φ, x), C computes y a[1] , . . . , a[n]). Here, C uses its input g a to compute an "affine function in the exponent" for g φ j (a[j]) . At the end, D sends (φ 1 , φ 2 ) to C and D wins if φ 1 = φ 2 and φ 1 (a) = φ 2 (a), where φ i = (φ 1 i , . . . , φ n i ), i ∈ {1, 2}. Since j was chosen uniformly at random and φ 1 = φ 2 , with probability at least 1 n , we have φ j 1 = φ j 2 but φ j 1 (a[j]) = φ j 2 (a[j]). In this case, a[j] = a is the root of the non zero affine function ψ = φ j 1 − φ j 2 , that can be easily computed.
Hence, we have
Adv kc Φ aff ,NR * (D) ≤ n · Adv dl G (C).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Let us first check the correctness condition.
Then, we have verified the correctness condition, and it is clear that the worst-case running time is the time to compute 2 n exponentiations in G, when x = 11 . . . 1 and none of the exponents is 0. Hence, only the uniformity condition remains to prove. We use the sequence of games in Figure 5 . Let us recall that the adversary is supposed to be unique-input, meaning that for any sequence of queries (φ 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (φ q , x q ), the entries x i , for i = 1, . . . , q are all distinct. We denote by hw(x) the Hamming weight of a bitstring x. In game G 0 , the "If" statement will always pass since hw(x) ≤ n for any bitstring of length n. Hence, we have Figure 5 : Games for the proof of Lemma 4.3.
We claim that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
The only difference between games G i and G i+1 is in the way that bitstrings x of Hamming weight n − i are handled. Indeed, such a string is fed to
. . , n. Now, since we need only deal with unique-input adversaries, this is the only time that G i will query f at input x (all other queries to f will be at other points with the same Hamming weight or at points with strictly smaller Hamming weight). Hence, the entire value computed above can equivalently be set to a value chosen uniformly at random. (This relies on the exponent for f (x) used in the computation being non-zero; this is guaranteed by the requirement that b[i] = 0, for i = 1, . . . , n and the fact that when y = x, the product k∈S(x)\S(y) c[k] is empty.) Setting the entire value to a uniformly random value is exactly what is done in G i+1 , and the claim follows. Finally, in G n , the "If" statement will never pass since hw(x) > 0 for any x ∈ {0, 1} n \{0} n , so we have
The uniformity condition follows.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let A be an adversary against the Φ aff -statistical-key-collision security for Fun(Z n p × {0, 1} n , G) that makes Q A queries. Since the function F defined in the Initialize procedure is a random function, A does not learn any information on the key a until b ← 1, so Adv skc Φ aff (A) is bounded by the probability that A makes use in its queries of two different RKD functions that lead to the same key. We claim that
This follows easily on noting that, if two different RKD functions lead to the same key, then those two functions must differ in some coordinate k. This means that the difference in those components is a non-constant affine function φ k such that φ k (a[k]) = 0, where a[k] is the k-th component of key a that was taken uniformly at random in the Initialize procedure. Since φ k is a non-constant affine function and a[k] is uniformly random in Z p , the probability that φ k (a[k]) = 0 is bounded by 1 p . To obtain the final result, one simply applies a union bound over the (at most) Q A 2 pairs of choices of different RKD functions accessed by A.
C Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof is based on the sequence of games in Figure 6 . Much of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 (which itself is based on the proof of the general framework of Bellare and Cash from [BC10a] ). The current proof, however, is somewhat simpler and has fewer games since it relies on a stronger security property of the underlying PRF M , namely its (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security. Let W i denote the event that game G i output takes the value 1.
. Adversary D runs A. When the latter makes a RKFn-query (φ, x), adversary D queries (φ, w[i]), for i = 1, . . . , |w|, to its oracle, then computes w and then h = H(x, w) and finally queries (φ, h) to its oracle and sends it to A. When A stops, D searches for two different RKD-functions φ queried by A that lead to the same value w and returns these two functions if found. Since w is a strong key fingerprint, two such functions lead to the same key, so D wins if he finds such two functions. (Of course, if the class of RKD-functions is claw-free, the advantage of the attacker is 0.) Game G 3 introduces the storage of hash values in a set G and sets flag 2 to true if the same hash output arises twice. Since this storage does not affect the values returned by RKFn, we have
where E 2 denotes the event that the execution of A with game G 3 sets flag 2 to true. We design an adversary C attacking the cr-security of H such that
proc RKFn(φ, x) / / G 9 91 y ← G(φ(K), x) 92 Return y Figure 6 : Games for the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Adversary C starts by picking K $ ← K and initializes j ← 0. It runs A. When the latter makes a RKFn-query (φ, x), adversary C responds via For i = 0, . . . , |w| do:
When A halts, C searches for a, b satisfying 1 ≤ a < b ≤ j such that h a = h b and, if it finds them, outputs (x a , w a ), (x b , w b ) and halts. The pairs (x a , w a ) and (x b , w b ) are distinct. Indeed, consider two cases: first, if φ a = φ b then since A never repeats an oracle query, ← S\G at random. Notice that this step guarantees that all values h are in S and are all distinct as long as A makes at most |S| queries. Finally, B sets G ← G ∪ {h}, makes the query (φ, h) to its oracle, and returns the value it gets, which is either M (φ(K), h) or a uniformly random value, to A. When A halts, B halts with the same output. The definition of S ensures that it does not contain any w[i] for i = 1, . . . , |w|. It follows from these observations that B is a unique-input adversary for queries in S. Finally, it is clear that if B's oracle gives real outputs of M for queries in S, then it simulates exactly game G 4 and if B's oracle gives uniformly random values for queries in S, then it simulates exactly game G 5 .
In game G 6 , we simply set the value y to a uniformly random value. Clearly, G 5 and G 6 are identical since the value returned is a uniformly random value for any query. Then, we have
In game G 7 , we check if two different queries can lead to a key collision. Since the "If" test ensures that the returned value is still uniformly random over R even when two different queries result in the same key, games G 6 and G 7 are identical. Hence,
In game G 8 , we compute the output of RKFn using a random function G in Fun(K × D, R). Since games G 7 and G 8 are identical until flag 3 is set to true, we have
where E 3 denotes the event that the execution of A with game G 8 sets flag 3 to true. To bound the probability of event E 3 , we design an adversary E attacking Φ-statistical-key-collision security for Fun(K × D, R) such that
Adversary E runs A. When the latter makes an RKFn-query (φ, x), so does E and E returns the value he receives to A. When A stops, if A has queried two different functions φ 1 and φ 2 such that φ 1 (K) = φ 2 (K) then b was set to 1 when the second of these two functions was queried by E, and then E wins. (Of course, if the class of RKD functions is claw-free, this probability is 0.)
Since A does not repeat oracle queries and since key collisions are dealt with in a similar way, it follows that games G 8 and G 9 are identical. Thus,
Equation (2) on page 11 now follows by combining the bounds arising in the different game hops.
D From Malleability to Unique-Input-RKA-Security
In this section, we explore the relationship between key-malleable PRFs and unique-input RKA secure PRFs. Specifically, we show that the (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security of a Φ-key-malleable PRF M is implied by its regular prf security if the key-transformer T associated with M satisfies a new notion of uniformity that we call S-uniformity and which is defined below.
S-Uniform Key-Transformer. Let M : K × D → R be a family of functions and Φ be a class of RKD-functions, such that there is a key-transformer T for (M, Φ). We generalize the uniformity property of a key-transformer, defined in [BC10a, Section 3.1], by allowing the uniformity condition to be restricted to a subset S of D. Indeed, let S be a subset of D; then we say that T is an S-Uniform Key Transformer if the games S-KTReal and S-KTRand defined in Figure 7 are perfectly indistinguishable for any Φ-restricted adversary A, where A belongs to the class of adversaries such that all queries (φ, x) with x ∈ S made by A to its oracle are for distinct values of x. That is,
Note that the standard uniformity condition given in Section 2 corresponds to the T being a Duniform key-transformer.
Theorem D.1 Let M : K × D → R be a family of functions and Φ be a class of RKD-functions, such that there exists an S-uniform key-transformer T for (M, Φ). Let A be an adversary against the (S, Φ)-unique-input-prf-rka security of M that makes Q A oracle queries. Then we can design an adversary B against the standard prf security of M such that
Moreover, the running time of B is that of A plus the time required to execute Q A times the keytransformer.
Proof of Theorem D.1: The proof is based on the sequence of games in Figure 8 . Let W i denote the event that game G i output takes the value 1.
proc Initialize / / S-KTReal Figure 7 : Games used in the definition of an S-uniform key-transformer T.
In game G 1 , we use the key-transformer T to compute M (φ(K), ·) via oracle calls to M (K, ·). The correctness property of the key transformer implies
In game G 2 , we replace the oracle M (K, ·) given to the key transformer T by a random function f . We design an adversary B attacking the standard prf security of M such that . Games G 2 and G 3 differ only in the way that queries (φ, x) with x ∈ S are handled. Indeed, for such queries, in G 3 , the output is just taken uniformly at random instead of computed using the key-transformer. Since the adversary A belongs to the class of Φ-restricted adversaries such that all queries (φ, x) with x ∈ S made by A to its oracle are for distinct values of x, games G 2 and G 3 match exactly games S-KTReal and S-KTRand, respectively. Since we assume that T is an S-uniform key-transformer T, these two games are perfectly indistinguishable. So
In game G 4 , we replace the random function f given to the key transformer T by the oracle M (K, ·). We design an adversary B attacking the prf security of M such that Finally, in game G 5 , instead of using the key-transformer T to compute M (φ(K), ·) via oracle calls to M (K, ·), we use M directly. The correctness property of the key transformer implies that
Equation (4) on 24 now follows by combining the bounds arising in the different game hops.
proc Initialize / / G 0 Application to NR * . In what follows, we apply Theorem D.1 and Theorem 5.1 to NR * to prove that the construction given in Section 4 is a Φ aff -RKA-secure PRF. Note that this gives an alternative proof of Theorem 4.5.
Let S = {0, 1} n \({w [1] , . . . , w[n]} ∪ {0 n }). The only point that remains to prove is that there exists an S-uniform key-transformer T aff for NR * and the class Φ aff of RKD functions. This result is actually implied by Lemma 4.3. Indeed, the same key-transformer is an S-uniform key-transformer for (NR * , Φ aff ). This statement is implied by the fact that games G 0 and G n−1 , defined in the proof of Lemma 4.3, are indistinguishable, even when the adversary is not a unique-input adversary with respect to the set S. To see why, note that the argument used to prove that Games G j and G j+1 are indistinguishable in that proof remains valid because all points in S have a strictly smaller Hamming weight than those in S. Hence, there exists an S-uniform key-transformer T aff for (NR * , Φ aff ), and NR * is an (S, Φ aff )-unique-input-RKA secure PRF. Finally, by applying Theorem 5.1, we can prove a similar statement to the one in Theorem 4.5.
Remark D.2 It is worth noting that it is not clear that the usual uniformity condition of a keytransformer directly implies that the same key-transformer is S-uniform for S ⊂ D without making additional assumptions about the key-transformer.
E Proof of Lemmas in Section 6
In this section, we give the proofs of lemmas in Section E.
E.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let D be an adversary against the Φ d -Key-Collision security of NR * that makes Q D oracle queries. Then we construct an adversary C against the d-SDL problem in G as follows. Adversary C receives as input a d-SDL tuple (g, g a , . . . , g a d ) where a $ ← Z p . Adversary C then picks j $ ← {1, . . . , n} at random; this is a guess of a coordinate where the two vectors of polynomial functions φ 1 and φ 2 that D will use as inputs in the Finalize procedure are different. Then C picks a[i] $ ← Z p for i = 1, . . . , n, i = j at random. Adversary C implicitly set a[j] = a. When D makes a query (φ, x), C computes a[1] , . . . , a[n]). Here, C uses its input (g a , . . . , g a d ) to compute a "polynomial function in the exponent" for g φ j (a[j]) . At the end, D sends (φ 1 , φ 2 ) to C and D wins if φ 1 = φ 2 and φ 1 (a) = φ 2 (a), where φ i = (φ 1 i , . . . , φ n i ), i ∈ {1, 2}. Since j was chosen uniformly at random and φ 1 = φ 2 , with probability at least 1 n , we have φ j
In this case a[j] = a is a root of the polynomial ψ := φ j 1 − φ j 2 , whose degree is at most d. So D factorizes ψ (using, for instance, the Kedlaya-Umans algorithm [KU11] , which has complexity sub-quadratic in d and logarithmic in p), and selects as its output the unique root r such that g r = g a . The claim follows.
(N, d)-Extended DDH ((N, d)-EDDH). Let G be a group of prime order p with generator g. Then the (N , d )-EDDH Problem in G consists of deciding, given Z = (Z[k, l]), for k = 0, . . . , N and l = 0, . . . , d with Z[0, 0] = g, whether Z[k, l] = g a k b l , with a 0 = 1, a i Lemma E.1 Let G be a group of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G and NR * : [1] , . . . , w[n]}). Let B be an adversary against the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * that makes Q B oracle queries. Then, assuming nd ≤ √ p, we can design adversaries B j against the (Q B , d )-EDDH problem in G, for j = 0, . . . , n − 1, and adversaries D k against the (n, k)-PDDH problem in G, for k = 1, . . . , d − 1 such that
The running time of B j is that of B plus O(Q 3 B (n · d + Q B )) operations in Z p . The running time of D k is that of B plus the time required to compute (at most) d · Q B exponentiations in G. Proof of Lemma E.1: The proof is based on the sequence of games of Figure 9 . Let B be an adversary against the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * , so B never queries the same entry x twice, for any x ∈ S.
Preliminaries. For a RKD-function φ = (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) ∈ Φ d , we let φ i be the polynomial defined by
. . , n. To each query (φ, x) of the adversary, we associate the following polynomials, for j = 1, . . . , n:
with unknowns A = (A 1 , . . . , A j ). These polynomials may have up to (d + 1) j (distinct) monomials and so cannot be expanded efficiently. But they can still be formally considered as row vectors
As vectors, they can be multiplied to other vectors or matrices (with indices from the set {0, . . . , d} j ) over Z p . We can also define the multiplication of such a vector with a column vector over G. Specifically, if U = (U[z]) z is a column vector with entries from G, then we write:
Let us suppose that we have a polynomial-time procedure TestLin which takes as input j, a list L of pairs (φ l , x l ) (for l = 1, . . . , L, such that P φ l ,x l ,j are linearly independent as polynomials) together with a pair (φ, x) and which outputs:
⊥
if P φ,x,j is linearly independent of the set {P φ l ,x l ,j |l = 1, . . . , L} λ = (λ [1] , . . . , λ[L]) otherwise, so that P φ,x,j = L l=1 λ[l]P φ l ,x l ,j Since the P φ l ,x l ,j are linearly independent polynomials, there is at most one possible λ. Unfortunately, we do not know any such polynomial-time procedure. But, as we will see later, we can approximate such a procedure by evaluating the polynomials, and this is sufficient for our purposes.
Indistinguishability of Game G 0 and Game G 1 . It is clear that game G 0 instantiates exactly the game defining the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * when b = 0.
In game G 1 , we respond to queries in S by uniformly random values, as is done in the game defining the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * when b = 1. However we do not reply to queries x / ∈ S as is done in that game. We design adversaries B j attacking the (Q B , d )-EDDH problem in G such that
For that purpose, we use the sequence of games in Figure 10 , in the following order: G 0,0 , G 0,0 , G 0,1 , . . . , G 0,n−1 , G 0,n . More precisely, we prove that G 0,j is indistinguishable from G 0,j under the (Q B , d )-EDDH assumption, while we show that G 0,j is perfectly indistinguishable from G 0,j+1 .
In G 0,0 , TestLin always returns an empty vector λ, L and T remain empty, and y is set to 1, i.e., the empty product. So G 0,0 is exactly G 0 .
proc Initialize / / G 0,j ; j = 0, . . . , n
Return y proc Initialize / / G 0,j ; j = 0, . . . , n − 1
Return y Figure 10 : Games G 0,j and G 0,j for the proof of Lemma E.1. assuming the existence of a perfect TestLin oracle (which we recall does not exist). Later, we will get the real bound using a concrete, approximate TestLin procedure.
Indistinguishability of Game
Let Z be an (N , d )-EDDH tuple. So Z[0, 0] = g with G = g . In the (Q B , d )-EDDH-Real case, we have Z[l, k] = g a l b k , with a 0 = 1 and b, a l $ ← Z * p for l = 1, . . . , Q B . In the (Q B , d )-EDDH-Rand case, we have Z[l, k] = g c l,k where c l,k $ ← Z * p , for (l, k) ∈ {0, . . . , Q B } × {0, . . . , d}, (l, k) = (0, 0). Adversary B j starts by picking a[i] $ ← Z p , for i = j + 2, . . . , n. Adversary B j then runs A. When the latter makes an RKFn-query (φ, x), adversary B j does everything as in Game G 0,j , except it does not return y but instead computes z and z as follows:
and returns z . Adversary B j does not compute y and y .
If Perfect Indistinguishability of Game G 0,j and Game G 0,j+1 . It remains to prove that Game G 0,j is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 0,j+1 . To establish that, we will consider another intermediate game (Game G 0,j in Figure 11 ). This game is not polynomial-time (since U contains (d + 1) j+1 entries), but we will show that it is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 0,j and Game G 0,j+1 .
proc Initialize / / G 0,j ; j = 0, . . . , n − 1
proc RKFn(φ, x) / / G 0,j ; j = 0 . . . , n − 1 / / φ = (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) / / φ i : A i → d j=0 α i,j · A j i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n y ← P φ,x,j+1 U y ← y Return y Figure 11 : Games G 0,j for the proof of Lemma E.1.
Let us first prove that Game G 0,j is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 0,j . We do this in two steps:
1. Let us show that we can compute T in G 0,j as follows:
with U computed as in G 0,j and L[l] = (φ l , x l ). If we look at T = (T[l, k]) l,k as a vector over Z L(d+1) p and M = (P φ l ,x l ,j · A k j+1 ) l,k as a matrix of L(d + 1) rows and (d + 1) j+1 columns (each row corresponding to a polynomial P φ l ,x l ,j · A k j+1 ), then we can write this as:
But since the polynomials P φ l ,x l ,j are linearly independent (and do not contain A j+1 ), the rows of M are also linearly independent, and M is full rank. Therefore, if U is random, then so is T, exactly as in Game G 0,j .
2. Supposing T is computed as in Equation (6), then the output y in Game G 0,j is equal to:
which is exactly the way it is computed in Game G 0,j .
Let us now prove that Game G 0,j is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 0,j+1 . We again use two steps, which are very similar to the previous ones:
1. Let us show that we can compute T in G 0,j+1 as follows:
T[l] = P φ l ,x l ,j+1 U
with U computed as in G 0,j and L[l] = (φ l , x l ). If we look at T = (T[l]) l as a vector over Z L p and M = (P φ l ,x l ,j+1 ) l as a matrix of L rows and (d + 1) j+1 columns (each row corresponding to a polynomial P φ l ,x l ,j+1 ), then we can write this as:
But since the polynomials P φ l ,x l ,j+1 are linearly independent, the rows of M are also linearly independent, and M is full rank. Therefore, if U is random, then so is T, exactly as in Game G 0,j+1 .
2. Supposing T is computed as in Equation (7), then the output y in Game G 0,j+1 is equal to:
Perfect Indistinguishability of Game G 0,n and Game G 1 . Let us now prove that Game G 0,n is perfectly indistinguishable from Game G 1 . We just need to prove that all polynomials P φ,x,n corresponding to queries (φ, x) with x ∈ S are linearly independent of all other polynomials P φ ,x ,n corresponding to queries (φ , x ). To prove this, let us suppose P φ,x,n with x ∈ S is a linear combination of some P φ 2 ,x 2 ,n , . . . , P φ m ,x m ,n : 1 · · · A z[n] n with z of highest Hamming weight. Necessarily, the Hamming weight of z is at least 2, since the Hamming weight of x 1 = x ∈ S is at least 2. But, since the sum is the zero polynomial, there must exist two distinct polynomials P φ i ,x i ,n and P φ i ,x i ,n containing this monomial A z [1] 1 · · · A z[n] n . Letẑ be the n-bit string such thatẑ[i] = 0 if z[i] = 0, whileẑ[i] = 1 otherwise, for all i. Then, since z has the highest possible Hamming weight, x i = x i =ẑ (from the definitions of P φ i ,x i ,n and P φ i ,x i ,n ). In additionẑ ∈ S, because the Hamming weight of z is at least 2, and so is the Hamming weight ofẑ. This means the adversary B queried twiceẑ ∈ S, which is forbidden.
TestLin Procedure. It remains to provide a polynomial-time TestLin procedure. Unfortunately, we do not know any polynomial-time exact procedure, but we provide an approximate one in Figure 12 . We assume in the analysis that nd ≤ √ p, which is true for sufficiently large p and fixed d, n.
Let us prove that this approximate procedure is incorrect with probability at most 1 p (over its random coins). The polynomials P φ l ,x l ,j with l = 1, . . . , L are supposed to be linearly independent. Then, there are two cases: procTestLin(j, L, (φ, x)) / / L[l] = (φ l , x l ) for l = 1, . . . , L and L = |L| Hence, we can prove that:
Indistinguishability of Game G 1 and Game G 2 under (n, k)-PDDH. Game G 2 instantiates exactly the game defining the (S, Φ d )-unique-input-prf-rka security of NR * when b = 1, so the only difference with game G 1 is in the way queries x with x / ∈ S are handled. We design adversaries D k against the (n, k)-PDDH problem in G such that
Adv (n,k)-pddh G (D k ) .
We prove this statement using the sequence of games of Figure 13 . Return y Figure 13 : Games G 1,k for the proof of Lemma E.1.
